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INTRODUCTION

The rights of minors to consent to their own health care is a
perennial dilemma facing the medical and legal communities.
Several circumstances, at the current time, have exacerbated this
dilemma. First, a majority of adolescents engage in sexual
activity well before they reach eighteen years of age, the age at
which they would be legally entitled, in most jurisdictions, to
consent to their own health care. Therefore, it is not surprising
that adolescents are contracting the HIV/AIDS infection at an
alarming rate1 and that other sexually transmitted diseases afflict
* Nancy Batterman is a Deputy Assistant Chief of the Division of Legal
Counsel in the New York City Law Department. She received her B.A.
(magna cum laude) from Cornell University in 1981 and her J.D. (cum laude)
from New York University School of Law in 1985
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author and should
not be taken to represent the views of the New York City Law Department or
the City of New York.

1. See Hearings Before the House Appropriations/Labor, Health and
Education and Related Agencies, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
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a large number of adolescents. 2 Second, and no less significant,
is the status of American family life. With divorce and teenage
pregnancy'rates soaring, a large number of minors spend their
childhood in single parent households 3 and, as a consequence,
have fewer adults around with whom health care practitioners,
practically or effectively, can communicate. Teenage substance
abuse and suicide rates are also on the rise in what many view as
a response to the larger problems teenagers face today. The
incidence of child abuse and incest is yet another disturbing
(1994) (statement of Dr. Bill Caspe, director of the Bronx Pediatric AIDS
Consortium). Dr. Caspe testified that "lals of September 1993 ...over

14,000 young people ages 13 to 24... have been diagnosed with AIDS" and
that HIV disease is "the sixth leading cause of death among young people 15 to
24 years old." Id. See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
SURVEILLANCE REP. 11 (3d quarter ed. 1993) (revealing that 980 males and
435 females between the ages of 13 and 19 were afflicted with AIDS during
the period from January 1, 1993 to September 30, 1993); Carmen Alicia
Fernandez, Venezuela: Adolescent Mothers Increasing Every Year, INTER.
PRESS SERV., Nov. 11, 1993 ("If the present situation continues, in three years
we will have 18,000 adolescents infected with AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases."); Bette Harrison & Elizabeth Lenhard, The AIDS
Epidemic: Women, Teens Fall as HIV Widens Its Range, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., March 11, 1994, § A, at 6 (explaining that one reason for the
increase of AIDS in adolescents stems from their belief that they are
"immortal").
2. See Benjamin R. Barber, America Skips School: Why We Talk So
Much About Education And Do So Little, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1993, at 39
(stating that "2.5 million adolescents annually contract a sexually transmitted
disease"); Bryanna LaToof, Increase in Teen Sex Paced By Rise In Disease,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 25, 1994, at ID ("Adolescents experience
higher rates of sexually transmitted disease (STD) than any other age group
and are the least likely to seek medical treatment.").
3. See Jerry Adler, Kids Growing Up Scared, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1994,
at 43 ("There has been a 200% growth in single-parent household[s], from 4
million to 8 million homes." (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE)); Ronald Brownstein, Clinton, Bush Step Up Debate on Family
Values; Politics: Both Focus on the Issue in Cleveland Speeches, L.A. TIMES,
May 22, 1992, at A22 (stating that there are "a growing number of single
parent families - 12% among whites, [and] 45% among blacks"); David
Popenoe, Mixed Blessings, CURRENT, Feb. 1993, at 36 (stating that the nuclear
family has progressively weakened over time due to increases in single-parent
families).
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factor plaguing American family life which inevitably interferes
with parental ability to engage in or advocate on behalf of a
minor's health care interests. Given the sensitive nature of these
issues, it comes as no surprise that the law has never adequately
addressed the question of whether, or when, a minor can consent
to his or her own health care. Courts and legislatures alike are as
fearful of encroaching upon parental rights 4 as they are of
exposing health care workers to increased liability. As a
consequence, even when our lawmakers directly confront these
issues, the results are mired in vagaries and ambiguities that will
be amply illustrated by this article's case study of New York
State law.
When legislatures do specifically promulgate minors' health
care legislation, it generally falls into one of two categories: a
given minor's status authorizes him or her to consent to health
care5 or a particular medical condition triggers the afflicted

4. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused Constitutional Status and
Meaning of ParentalRights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975 (1988). Professor McCarthy
noted that "there has been a natural tendency among courts and commentators
to define the underlying reasons why [parental] rights ought to be
respected .... ." Id. at 1016. The reason that state legislatures and courts do
not encroach upon parental authority is based on two assumptions. First,
"'parents possess what a child lacks in maturity," and second, parents will act
in the best interests of the child. Id. at 1019 (citations omitted).
5. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.6 (West 1982) (allowing a "minor 15
years of age or older who is living separate and apart from his parents or legal
guardian, whether with or without the consent of a parent.., and who is
managing his own financial affairs" to consent to medical care); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102 (1990 & Supp. 1993) (providing that a minor
can consent to medical treatment only if "the minor is married" or "is the
parent of a child"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.21.5(b) (1993) ("Any minor who is
emancipated may consent to any medical treatment, dental and health services
for himself or for his child."); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney
1993) (providing that "[a]ny person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is
the parent of a child or has married, may give effective consent for medical,
dental, health and hospital services"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 35.03 (West
1986) (providing that minors can consent to medical treatment "if the minor is
on active duty with the armed services of the United States" or "is 16 years of
age or older and resides separate and apart from his parents").
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minor's right to consent to his or her own health care. 6 As
implemented by legislatures, these categories are heavily value-

laden. For example, in the case of the medical condition trigger
category, the legislature has determined either that the condition
is too damaging to society as a whole to remain untreated 7 or that

the treatment is harmless enough to the minor to warrant its
application without parental consent. 8 With respect to the minor's
status category, the legislature there has decided that, inter alia,
getting married, joining the armed services, turning eighteen or
having a child, constitutes an act of physical, psychological or

economic separation from one's parents.

This separation

encroaches upon the parents' ability to determine the appropriate
health care for such children. 9 As will be further illustrated by

the New York State case study, legislatures have embraced a
hybridization of both these approaches. 10
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 34.5 (West 1982) (providing that "an
unemancipated minor may give consent to the furnishing of hospital, medical
and surgical care related to the prevention or treatment of pregnancy, and that
consent shall not be subject to disaffirmance because of minority"); GA. CODE
ANN. § 37-7-8 (1982) (allowing a minor to consent to treatment for drug abuse
"as if the minor had achieved his majority"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1095
(West 1992) (providing that a minor can consent to medical treatment where
the minor "believes himself to be afflicted with an illness or disease"); MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-102 (providing that in an emergency situation
"[a] minor has the same capacity as an adult to consent to medical treatment").
7. See, e.g., ANGELA R. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND
ADOLESCENT

MEDICINE

141-42 (1977).

Dr. Holder notes that "Itihe

consequences of untreated contagious diseases in general and venereal diseases
in particular are so enormous both to the child himself and to society in general
that common sense would require a physician to take the view that something
has to be done and to do it." Id. at 142.
8. In at least one instance, giving certain minors authority to donate blood
without parental consent fulfilled a different purpose -- the public's need to
increase the blood supply. Bill Jacket to N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3123,
1974 N.Y. Laws 64, at 5-7. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text.
9. See Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25
How. L.J. 525, 529 (1982) (stating that emancipation of a minor is best
characterized as the actual "release of the child by his parents and the actual
independence .... ").
10. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (waiving parental consent
requirement when an emergency exists but allowing a minor to consent where
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One of these legislative categories, the minor's status category,
is also reflected in two common law doctrines relevant to this
area -

-

the "emancipated minor" and the "mature minor"

doctrines. An "emancipated minor" is generally "one who (1) is
living separate and apart from parents with or without their
consent; (2) is self-supporting, but without regard to the source
of income; and (3) is managing his or her own financial
affairs." 11 The "mature minor" doctrine authorizes a minor to
consent to medical treatment without parental consent if that
minor is of sufficient maturity and intelligence to understand and
appreciate the benefits and risks of the proposed treatment; in
other words, the "developmental maturation of cognition"
provides the authority for such minors to consent to their own
treatment. 12 Whether these doctrines implicitly or explicitly
survive minors' health care legislation is another ambiguity that,
as the New York State case study will illustrate, continues to
puzzle courts and health practitioners alike.
A CASE STUDY - - NEW YORK STATE
A. PublicHealth Lmav section 2504 13

The present legislative scheme pertaining to the health care of
minors in New York State engenders a tremendous amount of
he or she is at least 18 years of age and/or married or pregnant); see also MD.
CODE ANN.,

HEALTH-GEN.

§ 20-102(a)-(b) (providing that emancipated

minors can consent to their own medical treatment but also allowing
unemancipated minors to give consent for emergency treatment).
11. J. MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 34 (1986). The common law
"emancipated minor" doctrine discussed herein should not be confused with
statutory emancipation provisions that allow minors to attain legal adulthood
before reaching the age of majority. C. Sanger & E. Willemsen, Minor
Changes: Emancipating Children in Minor Tunes, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 239
(1992).
12. MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 43.
13. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAWv § 2504 (McKinney 1993); see also infra
notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty and confusion. The focal point of this confusion,
section 2504 of the Public Health Law, was enacted by the State
Legislature on February 15, 1972.14 Section 2504 can be
characterized for the most part as a minor's status category piece
of legislation. Subsection 1 thereof, for example, states that
"[a]ny person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is the
parent of a child or has married, may give effective consent for
medical, dental, health and hospital services for himself or
herself, and the consent of no other person shall be necessary." 15
Subsection 2 goes on to authorize individuals "who [have] been
married or who [have] borne a child [to] give effective consent
for medical, dental, health and hospital services for [their]
children," 16 and subsection 3, which was added in 1984,17
authorizes pregnant individuals to "give effective consent for
medical, dental, health and hospital services relating to prenatal
care." 18 Only subsection 4 might be seen as falling into the
medical condition trigger category, since it waives any
requirement for the consent of a parent or legal guardian "when,
in the physician's judgment an emergency exists and the person is
in immediate need of medical attention and an attempt to secure
consent would result in delay of treatment which would increase
the risk to the person's life or health." 19 Finally, the statute
provides protection for health care workers in stating that persons
who act "in good faith based on the representation by a person
that he is eligible to consent pursuant to the terms of [section
2504] shall be deemed to have received effective consent." 20
The road to enactment of section 2504 was rocky, and the
provision has left many questions in its path. A predecessor

14. 1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § 1. This section became effective on June 2,
1972, pursuant to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § 2.
15. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1).
16. Id. § 2504(2).
17. See 1984 N.Y. Laws 976, § 1.
18. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(3).
19. Id. § 2504(4).
20. Id. § 2504(5).
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provision, A. 6585,21 was passed by both houses, but vetoed by
Governor Rockefeller in 1971.22 A. 6585 did not encompass
hospital services. It also did not allow minor parents of children
to give effective consent for the parents' own medical, dental and
health services. Finally, A. 6585 contained a paragraph, that was
deleted from the 1972 enactment, which enumerated specific
types of treatment for which all minors were authorized to give
effective consent:
Any minor may give effective consent for medical and health
services to determine the presence of or to treat pregnancy, drug
and alcohol abuse, tuberculosis, and other contagious, infectious,
or communicable diseases and the consent of no other person
23
shall be necessary.

In his veto message for A. 6585, Governor Rockefeller
expressed his concern that the proposed legislation contained
"internal inconsistencies and ambiguities[,] and . . . would not
sufficiently safeguard the interests of parents and the Community

at large in protecting minors from ill-advised medical
treatment."24 One commentator noted at the time that A. 6585
might have been a backwards step for New York in that there

were already many instances in which unmarried minors could
request and receive medical services and that the statute's own
exceptions to this general rule were far more limited and

ambiguously worded. 25 For example, municipal hospitals already
were performing abortions on minors without parental consent if
21. A. 6585, N.Y. Legis., 194th Sess. (1971). A. 6585 was to amend the
New York General Obligations Law rather than the Public Health Law. Id.
22. See Governor's Memoranda on Bills Vetoed, 1971 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN.
635 [hereinafter Governor's Memoranda].
23. A. 6585, supra note 21, § 1.
24. See Governor's Memoranda, supra note 22. The Governor also
mentioned that among the groups recommending disapproval of the bill were
the State Education Department, the Committee on Health of the Community
Service Society, and the Citizens Committee for Children. Governor's
Memoranda, supra note 22.
25. See Harriet F. Pilpel, Minors' Right to Medical Care, 36 ALB. L.
REv. 462, 469 (1972). Ms. Pilpel wrote her article before the enactment of
N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 and its 1984 amendment.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 2

TOURO LAW REVIEW

644

[Vol 10

the patients were at least seventeen years old, married or
emancipated, or if seeking parental consent might have
26
endangered their physical and mental health.
B. The "EmancipatedMinor" and "Mature Minor" Doctrines
in New York State
Not everyone was pleased after the New York State Legislature
had approved what is today's section 2504 of the Public Health
Law. 27 Letters urging the Governor to veto the measure were
26. Pilpel, supra note 25, at 469-70. Ms. Pilpel also criticized the
provision's emergency exception on the ground that "[m]aking an exception
for delay

. .

. [would] not cover many cases where the problem is not delay

but refusal to seek badly needed treatment if parental consent is a requisite."
Pilpel, supra note 22, at 470. The same criticism can be directed at today's
emergency exception. See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(4).
27. In letters written to Governor Rockefeller, several opponents of the bill
asserted that the bill, in practice, made health care unavailable to many minors
because it replaced the traditional, less restrictive "mature minor" and
"emancipated minor" doctrines with a more restrictive specific age
requirement. For example, a memorandum written on behalf of Dr. Alan
Miller, Commissioner of the New York Department of Mental Hygiene,
recognized that under the existing law at that time, a "responsible doctor"
could provide medical services to a "reasonably mature minor" without
obtaining parental consent. See Memorandum from Department of Mental
Hygiene to Michael Whiteman, Counsel to the Governor (May 24, 1972), in
Bill Jacket to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769. Furthermore, enactment of the bill would
"result in the use of stricter legal criteria [than the two doctrines traditionally
applied] in judging the conduct of responsible medical professionals and
institutions furnishing medical treatment to minors where it appears
professionally responsible to do so without parental consent." Id. Dr. Adele
Hofmann, writing for the New York Chapter of the Society for Adolescent
Medicine, reasoned that "physicians have been free to act on the concept of the
mature minor .... To now stipulate that an individual must be of a specific
age to receive health care on their own consent ... can only be viewed as
restrictive . . . ." Letter from Dr. Adele D. Hofmann to Governor Nelson

Rockefeller (May 15, 1972), in Bill Jacket to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769. Dr.
Hofmann also noted that "there is no recognition that many youths under 18
are living away from home or are otherwise emancipated ....

To fail to

bestow the right of self consent on these youths is to effectively deny them care
and penalize them if they try to act responsibly .and seek needed medical
attention." Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/2
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written by various parties, but the bill was signed into law. The
New York Chapter of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, for
example, wrote to the Governor that the bill would "block care
from some individuals [already] receiving it, impl[ied] a
restrictiveness to emergency care [then] now existent and totally

fail[ed] to meet the needs of certain categories of youths who
[had] been persistently denied health services because they [could
not] consent on their own." 28 This concern was also reiterated by
the Citizens Union of the City of New York, 29 the Citizens'
Committee for Children of New York, Inc.,30 the Community
Service Society, 31 and Planned Parenthood of New York City,
Inc. 3 2

These detractors often referred to the bill's omission of those
"emancipated" and "mature" minors who should have been
entitled to consent to their own medical treatment. 33 At its
inception,

the common

law

"emancipated

minor"

doctrine

28. Letter from Dr. Adele D. Hofmann to Governor Nelson Rockefeller
(May 15, 1972), in Bill Jacket to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § 1.
29. See Letter from Citizens Union of the City of New York to Hon.
Michael Whiteman, Counsel to the Governor (May 31, 1972), in Bill Jacket to
1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § 1 (expressing concern that "the bill might be held to
limit the right to treatment without parental consent... whereas many young
people not covered by this bill are now being so treated with presumed legality
under common law or other authorizations").
30. See Letter from Citizens' Comm. for Children of N.Y., Inc. to Hon.
Nelson Rockefeller (May 10, 1972), in Bill Jacket to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § I
(arguing that such a limited bill would delay effective resolution of the consent
issue in the future).
31. See Letter from Community Service Society to Hon. Michael
Whiteman, Secretary to the Governor (May 3, 1972), in Bill Jacket to 1972
N.Y. Laws 769, § 1 (urging against the legislation because it "should not
establish an arbitrary limitation that would meet the needs of some, but would
fail others with precisely the same problems").
32. See Letter from Planned Parenthood of New York City, Inc. to Hon.
Nelson Rockefeller (May 19, 1972), in Bill Jacket to 1972 N.Y. Laws 769, § I
(arguing that "legislation establishing 18 as the age at which a young person
may consent to medical services would be construed by many as a restriction
on the services now being given to those under 18" resulting "in further
confusion, cut-backs in accessibility to service and diminution of service now
available").
33. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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referred to a minor whose parents had relinquished their claims
on his or her earnings, 34 a concept that ultimately came to mean

that parents had relinquished control over their child's behavior
and personal affairs. 35 It is therefore not surprising to find this
doctrine most often referenced in New York cases involving child
support payments.
In Gittleman v.

Gittleman,36 for example,

a separation

agreement called for a reduction in alimony payments when a
'37
child either reached the age of eighteen or was "emancipated."
The fact that the child had moved from his mother's house to his

father's

house

was

deemed

insufficient

to

constitute

emancipation.38 In Zuckerman v. Zuckerman,39 a divorce
agreement called for support payments until the "child attained

34. See, e.g., Wayne County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Schultz, 81 Misc. 2d
603, 604, 366 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (Fam. Ct. Wayne County 1975) ("A self
supporting child is an emancipated child."); Harwood v. Harwood, 182 Misc.
130, 134, 49 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1944) (stating
that emancipation "has frequently and more accurately been held to operate
merely as a relinquishment to the child of its earnings, free of any of the rights
or claims thereto in favor of the parent").
35. MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33; see also Lawrence P.
Wilkins, Children's Rights: Removing the ParentalConsent Barrier to Medical
Treatment of Minors, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 31, 38-39 (1975).
The concept of emancipation has evolved over the years to enable minors to
be* the determinative force in their own emancipation at certain times.
MORRISSEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33-34. "Parental relinquishment of
claims to supervisory and controlling rights may now occur as much by passive
default or simple incapacity as by affirmative and deliberate permission.
Moreover, the ability of a minor to function as a self-supporting individual
need not be demonstrated by traditional employment alone." Id. See also
Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner'sLiabilityfor Treatment
Given Child Without Parent's Consent, 67 A.L.R.4th 511, § 2[a] (1989). The
factors establishing emancipation "vary to some degree[;j" however, the courts
generally look at marriage, age, whether the minor lives away from home and
if he or she makes independent financial decisions or is financially
independent. Id. at 518.
36. 81 A.D,2d 632, 438 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d Dep't 1981).
37. Id. at 632, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
38. Id. at 633, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 132.
39. 154 A.D.2d 666, 546 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1989).
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21 years of age, died, married, or became emancipated." 40 The
child was deemed to be emancipated when, at seventeen years of
age, he entered the United States Military Academy at West
Point. 4 1
Even outside the health care context, "emancipated minors"
have not been authorized to control every aspect of their daily
lives. 4 2 While being allowed, for example, to retain their own
wages,4 3 sue their parents for injuries that result from the
parent's negligence, 4 4 establish their own domicile, 4 5 and receive

40. Id. at 666, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67.
41. Id. at 668, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 667. It should be noted, however, that in
Staten Island Hosp. v. Porter, 59 Misc. 2d 389, 298 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1969), the court discussed an earlier line of cases involving separation
agreements in which induction into the armed services had not, in and of itself,
served to emancipate the minor. 59 Misc. 2d at 391, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 599. See
also Harwood, 182 Misc. at 134, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 730 (holding that the
"induction of [a] child into the armed services" does not emancipate the
minor). In these particular cases, the agreements themselves obligated fathers,
without exception, to pay their wives a stipulated amount during the infant's
minority, and the courts were loathe to unilaterally vary or destroy valid,
voluntary contracts. See also Bates v. Bates, 62 Misc. 2d 498, 310 N.Y.S.2d
26 (Faro. Ct. Westchester County 1970). In Bales, the court held that a child
had not been emancipated despite his refusal to attend school and alleged
participation in misconduct. Id. at 504, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 33. The father had
made weekly child support payments and listed the child as a dependent on his
federal income tax return. Id. at 507, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 35. The court found
that the child was entitled to support as it might determine. Id.; see also N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1991) (emancipation of child suspends
parent's support obligation); WILLIAM T. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMrNT
§ 14:80 (2d ed. 1961) (mother cannot compel child support payments where
child's dependency has ceased by emancipation due to marriage or service in
the armed forces).
42. See Rights and Responsibilities of Young People in New York, 1990
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REPORT 18 [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT].
43. Id. at 17; see also N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAv § 3-109 (McKinney 1989)
(stating that payment of wages to minors is valid unless notified in writing that
his or her parent or guardian is claiming such wages).
44. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 17.
45. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 17; see also In re Chrystol B.,
104 Misc. 2d 888, 891, 429 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (Faro. Ct. New York County
1980) ("Although emancipated minors can set up separate domiciles for
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public assistance, 46 they have been prohibited from signing their
own leases, buying, selling or controlling real property,47 or
obtaining employment certificates. 4 8 Moreover, in Moe v.
Dinkins,49 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to read an "emancipated minor" exception into
the State's Domestic Relations Law requirement that a person had
to be eighteen years old before he or she could marry without

parental consent. 50

There appears to be only one case within New York
jurisprudence that has addressed the "emancipated minor"
doctrine in the context of health care. In Bach v. Long Island
Jewish Hospital,5 1 a case that significantly preceded the
enactment of section 2504, a twenty-one year old woman sought
themselves, unemancipated minors continue to have their place of domicile,
the residence of their parents or guardians.").
46. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 17; see also Tucker v. Toia,
43 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977)
(holding unconstitutional a statute denying public assistance to emancipated
minors "solely on the ground that they have not obtained a final disposition in
a support proceeding..."); Edwards v. Travis, 57 A.D.2d 687, 393
N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (3d Dep't 1977) ("An emancipated minor over 16 years of
age may receive public assistance in her own right if she is 'otherwise
eligible.'" (citing N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. title 18, § 349.511]
(1976))).
47. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 18; see also N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 80 (McKinney 1988) (providing that "[w]here a minor for whom a
general guardian of the property has not been appointed shall acquire real
property, the guardianship of his property" belongs either to the parents or
closest living relative if there are no parents); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 84
(McKinney 1994) (stating that "[t]he lawful marriage of a person before he or
she attains majority terminates a general guardianship with respect to his or her
person, but not with respect to his or her property").
48. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
49. 635 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Coe v. Axelrod.
459 U.S. 827 (1982).
50. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7 (McKinney 1988). When minors do

marry without parental consent in New York State, however, the marriages are
still valid unless declared void by a court that has explored all of the
surrounding facts and circumstances. Id.
51. 49 Misc. 2d 207, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1966).
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to disaffirm the consent she had given when she was nineteen and
one-half years old to a non-emergency surgical operation that
resulted in scarring. 52 The woman was characterized by the Bach
court as "a minor emancipated by marriage" at the time she
53
consented to the procedure.
The Bach court cited a number of then-existing statutory
provisions, some of which are still operative today. 54 Most of the

provisions cited were from the Domestic Relations Law, and
stated, among other things, that an eighteen year old woman
could marry without parental consent and that, upon her
marriage, her guardianship was terminated with respect to her
person but not with respect to her property. 55 The Bach court
also cited what was then the Decedent Estate Law section 15,56
the Debtor and Creditor Law section 260, 57 and the General
Obligations Law section 3-101.58 From this litany, the Bach
52. Id. at 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91.
55. Id. at 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing DoM. REL. LAw §§ 15, 84).
56. N.Y. DECEDENT EST. LAw § 15 (McKinney Supp. 1966) (providing
that any minor attaining the age of eighteen years may make a will disposing of
his personal estate).
57. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LANV § 260 was repealed in 1964 and infant's
contracts are now governed entirely by N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101
(McKinney 1989). This section provides, in pertinent part:
A person who has attained the age of eighteen years shall have the
power, regardless of his minority to enter into a binding and enforceable
contract for a loan or loans with a bank, trust company, private
banker, . . . and to take any other action and execute any other

document or instrument to the extent necessary or appropriate to effect
any such loan, provide security thereof, carry out or modify the terms
thereof, and effect any compromise or settlement of any loan or of any
claim with respect thereto.
Id. at 3-101(4).
58. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAWv § 3-101 (a minor is only entitled to disavow
contracts under certain conditions). The Bach court cited an older special term
case, Cohen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 454, 269 N.Y.S.
667, 672 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1934), to support the proposition that
married minors may exercise custody and control over their children, and that
an emancipated minor may establish a domicile apart from the parental abode;
however, Cohen really only determined the latter principle.
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court deduced that the jurisdiction recognized a legal distinction
between a minor's personal and property rights. 59 Only the
former could be altered without the intervention of a guardian or
the court as parens patriae. The court thus reasoned that the
"[pilaintiff's consent to the surgical procedure involved was an
act of volition, and was a personal right which was validly
60
exercised.,,
The "mature minor" doctrine, which was also cited by the
initial critics of section 2504, is of such a subjective nature that it
has been even less popular with legislatures than the
"emancipated minor" doctrine. 6 1 A New York court recently
touched upon this issue in In re Long Island Jewish Medical
Center62 when it had to decide, in its role as parens patriae,
whether to order unlimited blood transfusions for Phillip
63
Malcolm, a boy seven weeks short of his eighteenth birthday.
As Jehovah's Witnesses, the boy and his parents refused to
consent to transfusions if they became medically necessary and
thereby thwarted the proposed chemotherapy treatment for the
boy's cancer. 64 Without such treatment, the boy was certain to
5
die. 6

59. Bach, 49 Misc. 2d at 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91
60. Id.
61. Veilleux, supra note 35, at 517; see also J. MORRISSEY ET. AL., supra
note 11, at 44 (noting that "[o]nly five states have laws specifically permitting
mature minors to consent to health care ...

without parental consent").

62. 147 Misc. 2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1990).
63. Id. at 724-25, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
64. Id. at 725, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 240. Two of Malcolm's treating
physicians testified at a court hearing that the necessary treatment would be
chemotherapy and radiation. Id. at 725-26, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 240-41. However,
blood transfusions would have to be performed before treatment could be
attempted, and further transfusions would be necessary during the
chemotherapy treatment. Id.
65. Id. at 726, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 241. According to Dr. Philip
Lanzkowsky, Chief of Pediatric Hematology and Oncology at Long Island
Jewish Medical (fenter, 75% of patients with Malcolm's condition that receive
treatment enter remission periods ranging from several months to years, and
25% to 30% of these patients are cured. Id.
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The Queens County Supreme Court observed that other states
had adopted the "mature minor" doctrine, 66 but that, in its view,
Phillip Malcolm was not a mature minor: he had never dated a

girl or been away from home, he consulted his parents before
making decisions, and he self-admittedly considered himself to be
a child. 67 The court also noted the many instances in which New

York State law permitted minors to consent to health care, 68 but
questioned whether the right to consent should be equated with
the right to refuse health care. 6 9 The court then recommended
that the legislature or the appellate courts "take a hard look at the
'mature minor' doctrine and make it either statutory or decisional

law in New York State[,]" as well as allow for a hearing to be

70
held first to determine whether a minor is or is not mature.
Since the court in In re Long Island Jewish Medical Center

concluded that Phillip Malcolm was not a mature minor, did it
implicitly authenticate the "mature minor" doctrine? Did it then
simply call for statutory or appellate confirmation? Given the

66. See infra nctes 129-163 and accompanying text.
67. Long Island Jewish, 147 Misc. 2d at 727, 730, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 24243.
68. Id. at 729-30, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAw §§ 9.13 (McKinney 1994) (enabling minors over 16 years of age to
receive inpatient treatment upon voluntary application and consent), 21.11
(allowing a minor to voluntarily seek inpatient or outpatient treatment for
alcohol or substance abuse without parental consent if a physician believes
treatment is necessary and is either unable to obtain parental consent or
parental involvement would have a "detrimental effect" on treatment), 33.21
(allowing minors to consent to voluntary mental health services if the minor
meets certain enumerated criteria); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2305(2)
(McKinney 1993) (waiving parental consent requirement for minors under age
21 for treatment of sexually transmitted diseases), 2504(1)-(2) (treating
pregnant minors and minor parents as adults with respect to decision making
capacity for their child's health care as well as their own).
69. Long Island Jewish, 147 Misc. 2d at 729, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
70. Id. at 730, 730 n.16, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 243, 243-44 n.16. It was then
recommended that the matter should end if the minor is found to be mature,
but that the hearing should continue outside the minor's presence if he or she is
found to be immature. Id. ("It is a terrible psychological shock to a patient to
hear for the first time how serious his or her physical condition is and how
minimal are the chances of survival.").
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extremely difficult position it found itself in, the court may have
viewed its rulings with respect both to the boy's maturity and to
the "mature minor" doctrine as a means to justify what it
considered a noble end - - saving Phillip Malcolm's life. In point
of fact, the "mature minor" doctrine is far more likely to be
recognized when the proposed treatment is for the minor's own
benefit; courts have refused to apply the exception when the
71
treatment is for the benefit of a third party.
In the aftermath of the enactment of section 2504 of the Public
Health Law, the relevant question one must ask is whether the
common law "emancipated minor" doctrine, apparently
supported by Bach, and the common law "mature minor"
doctrine, implicitly affirmed in In re Long Island Jewish Medical
Center, survived the statutory codification of consent
requirements for the health care of minors. Those parties urging
Governor Rockefeller to veto the bill ostensibly answered this

question in the negative. 72 Were they right to jump to this
conclusion, and does subsequent jurisprudence or the experiences
of other jurisdictions shed any light on this topic?

With respect to the "emancipated minor" doctrine, the first
possibility to consider is that the legislators assumed that they
had taken care of the entire universe of emancipated minors by
71. See Veilleux, supra note 35, at 523-24. For example, where a fifteen
year old boy consented to an operation to provide his cousin with flesh for a
skin graft, the court found that the boy's parents' consent had been necessary.
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
Another New York court recently faced the issue of a minor's refusal of
treatment in In re Thomas B., 152 Misc. 2d 96, 574 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct.
New York County 1991). There, a fifteen year old boy vigorously objected to
the use of surgical intervention to perform the biopsy of a tumor. Id. at 97,
574 N.Y.S.2d at 660. The family court granted his biological mother's petition
for an order requiring the child to undergo the diagnostic surgery, under
physical restraint if necessary, because she considered the treatment to be in
the child's best interests. Id. at 99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 661. Of special interest is
how the court interpreted Public Health Law § 2504 in order to support its
holding. Id. at 98-99, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61. The court claimed that "[a]n
implicit corollary of that provision is that a person under 18 years of age may
not give effective consent" and that "it follows logically that such a person
may not effectively withhold consent, either." Id.
72. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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authorizing married minors, like the plaintiff in Bach, to consent
to their own medical, dental, health and hospital services. 73 Since
Bach appears to be the only New York State case considering the
"emancipated minor" doctrine in the health care context, this
possibility is not entirely remote. On the other hand, the
legislators may have also dismissed Bach's utility because the
plaintiff herself, not her parents, was seeking to renege a
seemingly valid consent she had given to an earlier treatment. 74
Moreover, the only adverse consequence the plaintiff had
suffered was scarring, 75 and the Bach court may have
legitimately been disposed to side with the hospital which had
76
cautiously performed the biopsy.
C. A CompetingLegislative Proposal?
Another piece to the puzzle of the legislators' intent in
promulgating Public Health Law section 2504 resides in a bill
that remained in committee the same year that the New York
Legislature approved the provision. That bill, S. 9464, 77 was
introduced by former Senator A. Frederick Meyerson, and
provided, inter alia, that "[a] person of at least sixteen years of
age or an emancipated minor may consent to the provision of
healt. services to himself. " 78 The bill defined emancipated
minor, "without limitation to its meaning at common law," as "a
minor who is or has been married, is self-supporting,
is
managing his own financial affairs, or is residing apart from his
73. See N.Y. PuB. HALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 1993) (providing

that "[a]ny person who is eighteen years of age or older, or is the parent of a
child or has married, may give effective consent for medical, dental, health
and hospital services ....

").

74. Bach, 94 Misc. 2d at 208, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
75. Id.
76. Some commentators have also cited Bach for the proposition that New
York courts support the "mature minor" doctrine. However, since the plaintiff
in Bach was married and living with her husband, it would be more
appropriate to view Bach as an "emancipated minor" doctrine case. See
NYSBA REPORT, supra note 42, at 87 n.3.
77. S. 9464, N.Y. Legis., 195th Sess. (1972).
78. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2432.
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parents."' 79 The bill also stated that "[n]othing contained in this
article shall be deemed to abrogate or in any way limit the right
of a minor to consent to the provision of health services to
80
himself under common law."

Senator Meyerson's bill included other distinct provisions. For
example, one paragraph enumerated specific types of treatment
for which persons of any age could provide effective consent
under particular circumstances:
A person of any age may consent to the provision to himself of
health services relating to the prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and prescription for alcohol abuse, drug abuse and pregnancy
where, in the judgment of the attending physician for reasons
stated in writing, it would be inimical to the person's mental or
81
physical health to attempt to seek parental consent.
In this respect, Senator Meyerson's bill shared a similarity with
the vetoed A. 6585,82 although A. 6585 more broadly
encompassed tuberculosis and other contagious, infectious, or
83
communicable diseases.
Senator Meyerson's bill also provided that "[a]ny minor may
consent to the provision of health services to himself in an
emergency," 84 thereby alleviating the burden placed on
79. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2434(1) (emphasis added).
80. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2435 (emphasis added).
81. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2433(l); see also supra note 21.
82. A. 6585, supra note 21.
83. It should be noted that before either A. 6585 or S. 9464 were drafted,
New York State already provided statutory authorization for the diagnosis,
treatment and prescription of persons under 21 years of age infected with, or
exposed to, sexually transmissible diseases without parental consent. See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2305(2) (McKinney 1993).
To the extent that A. 6585 encompassed communicable diseases, it may have
intended to accomplish the admirable purpose of consolidating in one location
all provisions relating to the medical treatment of minors, whether due to their
status or due to their particular health needs. Given the plethora of statutes that
have been promulgated since § 2504 was enacted in 1972, see infra notes 90101 and accompanying text, the consolidation of all provisions concerning the
medical treatment of minors in one location is once again a worthy goal. See
also supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
84. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2432.
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physicians, by both A. 6585 and today's section 2504, to

determine

that

given

circumstances

warrant

immediate

treatment. 85

Other sections in Senator Meyerson's bill seem to
have attempted to ensure that physicians would not be held liable
for going forward with treatment of a minor regardless of what
analysis they were or were not called upon to make. For
example: (a) proposed section 2434 provided that a minor's
consent under the article's terms, and accepted in good faith,
should be as effective as if the minor had reached his or her
majority; 86 (b) a proposed amendment to section 3-101 of the
General Obligations Law provided a new subdivision stating that
an infant's contract under the article could not be disaffirmed by
him on the ground of infancy where the contract was reasonable
and provident when made; 87 and (c) a proposed amendment to

section 145-a of the Insurance Law provided, inter alia, that any
minor authorized under the article to consent to the provision of
health services would be deemed competent to contract for
accident and health insurance upon his own person or upon the
88
person of his wife or children.
85. However, under § 2433 of Senator Meyerson's bill, physicians still
had to make comparable judgments for the treatment of alcohol abuse, drug
abuse and pregnancy. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2433. Some of these
requirements have since been codified. For example, § 21.11 of the Mental
Hygiene Law provides that minors may only be treated without parental
consent for alcohol abuse if the requirement of consent would be detrimental to
treatment or the parent has refused consent and the doctor believes that the
treatment is in the minor's best interests. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 21.11
(McKinney 1994).
86. S.9464, supra note 77, § 2434.
87. S.9464, supra note 77, § 2.
88. S.9464, supra note 77, §§ 2, 3. The proposed amendment to § 145-a
of the Insurance Law would also have enabled minors consenting to the
provision of health services "to exercise and enjoy every right, privilege and
benefit to which he may become entitled under such contract and to give a
valid discharge for any benefit accruing or money payable thereunder."
S.9464, supra note 77, § 3; N.Y. INS. LAW § 145-a (McKinney 1985).
Section 3-101 of the General Obligations Law seems never to have been
amended to reflect Senator Meyerson's concerns. Since it was originally
enacted in 1963, this section has provided, inter alia, that "[a] contract
made... by a person after he has attained the age of eighteen years, may not
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Perhaps Senator Meyerson was just seeking to clarify what
section 2504 had left unclear, rather than carving out a materially
broader category of minors entitled to consent to their own health
care. The proposed General Obligations Law and Insurance Law
amendments certainly seemed aimed at clarification. So did the
Meyerson bill's explicit definition of "health services" as
"professional services provided by duly authorized or licensed
persons in the practice of medicine and dentistry." 89 Still, the
concerns of section 2504's objectors ring in our ears, and it is
hard not to assume that Senator Meyerson's bill sought to address
what these objectors considered section 2504's failings.

be disaffirmed by him on the ground of infancy, where the contract was made
in connection with a business in which the infant was engaged and was
reasonable and provident when made." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101(2)
(McKinney 1989). The statute also authorizes husbands and wives, regardless
of their minority, to enter into loan contracts with banks regarding real
property they are occupying as a home. Id. § 3-101(3) (McKinney 1994).
However, no provision blanketly affirms any infant's contract when reasonably
and providently made. Part of Senator Meyerson's concern seems to have been
addressed through a 1968 amendment to the General Obligations Law
providing that "[a]n obligation incurred by a married minor for hospital,
medical and surgical treatment and care for such minor or such minor's
children shall not be voidable because of minority. For the purpose of this
section only, subsequent judgment of divorce or annulment shall not alter the
obligation previously incurred." Id. § 3-102(1). Obviously, based on its
language, this provision does not cover minors who have never married.
With respect to Senator Meyerson's proposed amendment to the Insurance
Law, the Insurance Law was recodified in 1984 and the derivation tables
thereto indicate that former § 145 is now represented by § 3207(a), a provision
that concerns itself solely with life insurance contracts by or for the benefit of
minors. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3207(a) (McKinney 1985).
It should also be reiterated at this point that subdivision 5 of today's Public
Health Law § 2504 also deems effective consents authorized by the provision
that are acted upon in good faith. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(5)
(McKinney 1993).
89. S. 9464, supra note 77, § 2431(1).
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D. Other New York State Statutes Addressing Minors' Health
Care
As noted, section 2504 is not the only provision for the health
care of minors that New York State has enacted. 90 The other
provisions relate to particular health needs of minors, rather than
their individual statuses, and therefore fall into the medical
condition trigger category. 9 1 On May 1, 1970, for example,
licensed or staff physicians in hospitals were authorized to treat
persons under twenty-one years of age for sexually transmissible
diseases without the consent or knowledge of parents or
guardians. 92 Although before 1972, people eighteen years of age
were authorized to donate blood without obtaining parental
consent, minors seventeen years of age or over are now able to
93
donate blood under the same conditions.
Ten years after section 2504 was enacted, the New York State
Legislature authorized treatment for alcohol abuse and alcoholism
without parental consent for minors of all ages if the requirement
of consent would be detrimental to such treatment or the parent
had refused to consent to what the physician believed was in the
minor's best interests. 94 Minors may also knowingly and
90. See supra note 68 for other provisions.
91. See supra note 68.
92. See supra note 83. This provision was first added by 1970 N.Y. Laws
361. At that time, it provided that "[a] licensed physician may diagnose, treat
or prescribe for a case of venereal disease in a person under the age of twentyone years without the consent or knowledge of the parents or guardian of said
person." Id.
93. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3123 (McKinney 1993) (added by
1968 N.Y. Laws 158 and amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws 64).
94. See 1982 N.Y. Laws 407; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 21.11
(McKinney Supp. 1994) ("If... consent would have a detrimental effect on
the course of treatment of a minor ...or if a parent or guardian refuses to
consent to such treatment and the physician believes that such treatment is
necessary for the best interests of the child, such treatment may be provided to
the minor. . . ."). Although the statute does not explicitly so provide, it can
be relied upon as authorizing treatment of minors for other substance abuse
problems without obtaining parental consent. There is support for this
approach both in the supporting memorandum of Assemblyman Eliot L. Engel,
see 1982 N.Y. LEG. ANN. 136, and in the regulations outlining residential
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voluntarily consent to certain outpatient mental health care if the
same enumerated conditions are met. 95 If a minor is at least
sixteen years of age, he or she can voluntarily consent to
96
inpatient mental health treatment.
In 1988, when the New York State Legislature enacted Article
27-F of the Public Health Law 9 7 concerning HIV and AIDS

Related Information, the medical treatment of minors was
considered in a slightly different manner. Section 2780(5) defines

"capacity to consent" as

"an individual's ability, determined without regard to the
individual's age, to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of a proposed health care service, treatment or
procedure, or of a proposed disclosure of confidential HIV
chemical dependency programs for youths. See N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. &
REGS. tit. 14, § 1032.4(c) (1991). Nonetheless, it should be noted that a year
before §21.11 was enacted, an earlier version that expressly included
treatment for substance dependence without parental consent was recalled by
Senator Goodhue at the request of.the Governor. Apparently, substance abuse
programs across New York State had serious problems with the earlier
legislation. See Letter from the State Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol
Abuse to Hon. John G. McGoldrick (June 17, 1982), in Bill Jacket to 1972
N.Y. Laws 407.
95. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.21(c) (McKinney 1994)
96. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.13(a), 33.21 (McKinney 1988 &
Supp. 1994). ("The director of any hospital may receive as a voluntary patient
any suitable person in need of care and treatment, who voluntarily makes a
written application therefor.") In actuality, the inpatient branch of these
provisions, § 9.13(a), originated in 1972, the very same year that § 2504 was
enacted. See 1972 N.Y. Laws 251 at § 31.13(a). The outpatient branch,
§ 33.21 of the Mental Hygiene Law, stems from 1983 N.Y. Laws 790.
However, New York State still has no specific provisions governing abortion,
contraception, or sterilization, with respect to minors. Many of these issues
have been the subject of intense litigation and are moderated by overriding
federal constitutional principles and congressional regulation. See, e.g.,
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (stating parental consent requirement
does not unconstitutionally burden a minor's right to seek an abortion if state
also provides an alternative procedure whereby authorization for abortion can
be obtained); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (declaring
unconstitutional a New York law which prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to minors under 16).
97. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney 1993).
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related information, as the case may be, and to make an

informed decision concerning the service, treatment, procedure
or disclosure. "98

Article 27-F then provides, inter alia, that "no person shall
order the performance of an HIV related test without first
receiving the written, informed consent of the subject of the test
who has capacity to consent or, when the subject lacks capacity
to consent, of a person authorized pursuant to law to consent to
health care for such individual." 9 9 Hence, provided a minor has
the capacity to consent and has provided a written, informed
consent, 100 he or she may be tested for HIV infection without the
parent's or guardian's consent. 101
What, if anything, do these provisions tell us about the present
status of the "emancipated minor" and "mature minor" doctrines
in New York State? Most noteworthy, sections 21.11102 and
33.21103 of the Mental Hygiene Law, which were both
promulgated after section 2504 and deal, respectively, with a
minor's treatment for alcoholism and outpatient mental health
care, define "minor" for their individual purposes as "a person
under eighteen years of age.., not includ[ing] a person who is
" 04
the parent of a child, or has married or is emancipated. 1
Thus, so-called "emancipated minors" can avail themselves of
the designated services without parental consent even if a
requirement of consent would not be detrimental to such
treatment or a given parent has not refused such consent.
What at first blush appears to be a conscious expansion of the
section categories of minors authorized to consent to their own
health care, under section 2504, is muddied by the two bills'
98. Id. § 2780(5) (emphasis added).
99. Id. § 2781(1).
100. Id. § 2781(2). Subsection 2 outlines the contents of an informed
consent statement, which must include, inter alia, an explanation of the test,
the procedures to be followed, and the confidentiality protections afforded
HIV-related information. Id.
101. Id. § 2781(1).
102. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 21.11 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
103. Id. § 33.21 (McKinney 1988).
104. Id. § 21.11(a); see also id. § 33.21(a).
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supporting commentaries. 105 In the bill jacket to the alcoholism
treatment provision, the State Division of Alcoholism and
Alcohol Abuse noted that section 21.11's definition of "minor"
was "consistent with section 2504 of the Public Health Law, and
confront[ed] the need to deal with 'mature minors' or
'emancipated minors."' 106 In contrast, the memorandum
accompanying the outpatient mental health services provision, a
Governor's Program Bill, noted that "Public Health Law section
2504 enables... unemancipated individuals under eighteen to
consent to such services only upon a physician's determination of
an emergency requiring immediate medical attention."' 10 7 Thus,
implying that "emancipated minors" could consent to such
services under section 2504 even in the absence of an emergency.
Additionally, a New York State Bar Association report, filed to
support the outpatient mental health provision, included among
its list of exceptions to the parental consent requirement the
"emancipated minor doctrine," but presumed that courts, not
10 8
physicians, would first make this determination.
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
A. The "EmancipatedMinor" Doctrine
Other states have similarly enacted a patchwork of legislation
addressing health care for minors based upon a minor's status
and/or medical condition. 109 Their courts have also been called
105. See Letter from State Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Services to
Hon. John G. McGoldrick (June 17, 1982), in Bill Jacket to 1982 N.Y. Laws
407; Bill Jacket to 1983 Laws 790, at 10.
106. Letter from State Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Services to
Hon. John G. McGoldrick (June 17, 1982), in Bill Jacket to 1982 N.Y. Laws
407.
107. Bill Jacket to 1983 N.Y. Laws 790, at 10.
108. Id. at 17.
109. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 210 (Smith-Hurd 1993);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-34-104, 68-34-107 (1992), §§ 39-4-202 (1991),
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upon to interpret and struggle with legislative intent. 110 One
illustrative case involving the state of Washington is Smith v.
Seibly.111 As in Bach, 112 the plaintiff attempted to retroactively

invalidate his and his wife's consent, in this case, to a vasectomy
operation after he had reached the age of majority. 113 At the time
of consent to the operatio*n, the plaintiff had been a married
eighteen year old minor and father who was a high school
graduate and head of his own family.11 4 He also owned his own
home and supported himself financially. 115 The plaintiff sought
the operation because he was afflicted with a progressive,
incurable disease and wanted to limit the size of his family.116
The surgeon had appropriately informed the plaintiff about the
permanency of the procedure and had given him a chance to think
117
about the operation overnight.
The trial court had instructed the jury that the law in
Washington at the time provided that operations could not be
performed on minors unless consent was first obtained from the
minor's natural guardians or parents, except if the operation was
for the benefit of the minor and was done with the purpose of
saving the minor's life or limb. 118 The Supreme Court of
Washington recognized that emancipation of minors may occur
even in the absence of a statute, and that "age, intelligence,
maturity, training, experience, economic independence or lack
thereof, general conduct as an adult and freedom from the control
of parents [we]re all factors to be considered in such a case." 119
§§ 63-6-220, 63-6-222, 63-6-223 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 70.24.110
(West 1992), §§ 18.71.220 (1989), 26.28.015(5) (1986).

1989); Cardwell v.
110. See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (I11.
Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Koome, 530 P.2d 260 (Wash.
1975); Smith v. Seibly, 431 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1967).
111. 431 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1967)
112. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
113. Smith, 431 P.2d at 721.

114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 722 n.2.
Id.at 723.
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Therefore, the Supreme Court of Washington determined that the
trial court had properly instructed the jury as to the factors to be
weighed in determining the plaintiff's capacity to consent to the
operation. 120
In Smith, the Supreme Court of Washington was not faced with
a statutory scheme nearly as comprehensive as that in place in
New York. In fact, most of the Washington statutes addressing
aspects of a minor's health care were not enacted until after Smith
was decided. 121 In 1969, for example, two years after Smith was
decided, minors fourteen years or older were authorized to
consent to the diagnosis and treatment of venereal disease. 122 In
1971, eighteen year olds were expressly authorized "[t]o make
decisions in regard to their own body and the body of their lawful
issue[,] whether natural born to or adopted by such person[,] to
the full extent allowed to any other adult person including but not
limited to consent to surgical operations." ' 12 3 This was also the
same year in which physicians who were acting in good faith and
rendering emergency care to any patient regardless of age were
immunized from civil liability even where the patient, or
someone else legally authorized, had not consented to the
treatment. 124
One wonders, however, whether these later statutes would have
made a difference in the Smith decision. In 1975, when these
statutes already had been codified, the Supreme Court of
Washington had the opportunity to address an issue similar to
that presented in Smith. In State v. Koome, 125 the court
invalidated a statute requiring an unmarried woman to obtain
parental consent prior to obtaining an abortion, 126 noting the
statutes that already recognized a minor's competence to consent

120. Id. at 724.
121. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
18.71.220 (1989), 26.28.015(5) (1986).
122. Id. § 70.24.110 (West 1992).
123. Id. § 26.28.015(5) (Supp. 1994).
124. Id. § 18.71.220.
125. 530 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1975).
126. Id. at 268.

§§70.24.110 (West 1992),
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to medical treatment. 12 7 The court further observed that none of
these other provisions either stated or implied that persons under
eighteen years of age did not have the right or capacity to make
decisions regarding medical treatment, except for the abortion
statute it was presently reviewing. 12 8 Interestingly enough, after
Smith and Koome, the Washington State Legislature did not
attempt to enact amendments to any of these provisions or to
promulgate a more comprehensive statutory scheme.
B. The "MatureMinor" Doctrine
In In re E. G.,129 the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed the
"mature minor" doctrine in a case involving a minor very much
like In re Long Island Jewish Hospital's Phillip Malcolm. E.G., a
seventeen year old female, diagnosed with acute nonlymphatic
leukemia, and her mother refused to consent to blood
transfusions prescribed to combat E.G.'s condition on the
13 0
grounds of their religious convictions as Jehovah's Witnesses.
Here, however, unlike Phillip Malcolm in In re Long Island
Jewish Hospital, the court expressly concluded that minors with
the requisite degree of maturity do have a limited right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment. 131
Illinois, like New York, had certain statutory provisions
regarding minors' health care that existed even at the time the
E.G. decision was rendered. 132 The Illinois Consent by Minors
127. Id. at 266; see also supra note 121. The Koome Court also

acknowledged WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.54.060, which was enacted in
1971 and authorized persons fourteen or older to consent to treatment for
alcohol and drug abuse and parental notification thereof. Id. This provision
was repealed in 1989. See 1989 Wash. Laws ch. 270 § 35.
128. Koome, 530 P.2d at 266-67.
1989).
129. 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.
130. Id. at 323.
131. Id. at 327-28 ("If the evidence is clear and convincing that the minor is
mature enough to appreciate the consequences of her actions.., then the
mature minor doctrine affords her the common law right to consent or to
refuse medical treatment.").
132. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, paras. 30/1-30/11, ch. 410 para.
210/4 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
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to Medical Procedures Act 133 granted minors the legal capacity
to consent to medical treatment in certain situations, such as if
those minors were married, pregnant or were at least twelve
years of age and sought treatment for venereal disease,
alcoholism or drug addiction. 134 The Illinois Emancipation of

Mature Minors Act 1 35 enabled mature minors, defined as minors
between sixteen and eighteen years of age who had
"demonstrated the ability and capacity to manage their own
affairs and to live wholly or partially independent[ly]" from
parents or guardians, 136 to obtain a judicial declaration of
emancipation and thereby control his or her own medical
137
treatment decisions.
The Supreme Court of Illinois referred to these two acts, as
well as the Illinois Juvenile Court Act 138 and the United States
Supreme Court's abortion decisions, 13 9 to determine that "mature
minors may possess and exercise rights regarding medical care
that are rooted in [Illinois'] common law."' 140 The court then
outlined the guidelines for trial courts called to apply the "mature
minor" doctrine in comparable cases. 14 1 Unless the legislature
133. Id. ch. 410, paras. 210/01-210/5.
134. Id. ch. 410, para. 210/4. Physicians and dentists are also authorized to
render emergency treatment or first aid to a minor without consent "if, in the
sole opinion of the physician, dentist or hospital, the obtaining of consent is not
reasonably feasible under the circumstances without adversely affecting the
condition of such minor's health." Id. at chap. 410, para. 210/3.
135. Id. ch. 750, paras. 30/1-30/11.
136. Id. ch. 750, para. 30/3-2.
137. Id. ch. 750, para 30/9.
138. Id. ch. 705, paras. 405/1-1-405/1-16.
139. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 440 (1983) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance making "blanket
determination[s] that all minors under the age of fifteen are too immature to
make [abortion] decision[s] and that abortions without parental consent may
never be in the best interests of a minor); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 64344 (1979) (concluding that a pregnant minor could not be denied an abortion
for lack of parental approval without the opportunity to demonstrate that she is
sufficiently mature to make an independent abortion decision or that, despite
her immaturity, an abortion would serve her best interest).
140. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 326.
141. Id. at 327-38.
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provided otherwise, the trial judge would have to determine by
clear and convincing evidence that a minor is mature enough to
make health care choices. 142 The judge's intervention is premised
on Illinois' valuation of the sanctity of life 143 and the state's
parens patriae power to protect those incapable of protecting
themselves. 14 4
Once this common law right to consent to, or to refuse,
medical treatment is established, 145 it "must be balanced against
four State interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) protecting the
interests of third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."146
Viewing the second interest as most significant, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that "both E.G. and her mother agreed that
E.G. should turn down the blood transfusions" on religious
grounds and, therefore, that the trial court had no need to give
14 7
serious consideration to E.G.'s mother's wishes.
Since E.G. was no longer a minor at the time that the Illinois
Supreme Court rendered its decision, it did not bother remanding
the case to the trial court to make an "explicit determination of
E.G.'s maturity." 148 Certain factors, however, illuminate that
E.G., unlike Phillip Malcolm, would have very likely been
declared a mature minor. Several witnesses, for example,
confirmed E.G.'s maturity at the initial hearings, including a
psychiatrist with special expertise in evaluating the maturity and
142. Id. at 327.

143. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (I11. 1989) (stating
judicial scrutiny is appropriate in deciding whether to refuse or withdraw
artificial nutrition since a "presumption exists favoring life").
144. Id. at 301.
145. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327. To establish a minor's common law
right to consent to or refuse medical treatment, "the trial judge must weigh
these two principles [public policy favoring life and parenspatriael against the
evidence ... of a minor's maturity." Id. If there is "clear and convincing"
evidence that the minor is sufficiently mature to "appreciate the consequences
of her actions," and "exercise the judgment of an adult," her common law
right is established under the mature minor doctrine. Id. at 327-28.
146. Id. at 328 (citing Estate ofLongeway, 549 N.E.2d at 299).
147. Id. at 328.
148. Id.
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competency of minors. This psychiatrist confirmed that E.G. had
the maturity of an eighteen to twenty-one year old and the
competency to make an informed decision to refuse the blood
transfusions, even if her choice was fatal. 149 Even when the trial
court had initially ruled that E.G. was medically neglected, it
described her as a mature seventeen year old who had reached
her decision on an independent basis and who was "fully aware
150
that death [was] assured absent treatment."
Thus, although faced with the potential, if not inevitable, loss
of a young life, the Illinois Supreme Court chose to recognize a
mature minor's right to refuse treatment at common law. Did
E.G.'s obvious maturity and present age of majority sway the
court's decision? To a certain degree, one might say that it did,
but the court still chose to outline a doctrine that could be applied
in other distinct cases wherein the minors involved might exhibit
very different characteristics.
In Cardwell v. Bechtol, 15 1 a decision cited by the Illinois
Supreme Court in In re E. G., 152 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
adopted a "mature minor" exception to the common law rule that
a physician obtain parental consent before treating a minor,
despite the absence of express statutory authority. 153 Moreover,
prior to Cardwell, Tennessee legislation had existed regarding
medical treatment of minors. 154
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 324.
724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (I11.1989).
Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748-49 (stating that adopting the mature

minor exception to the commQn law rule is "wholly consistent" with existing
statutes and adds to the "growth and development" of the Tennessee common
law).
154. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-6-220 (1990) (authorizing
physicians to treat juvenile drug abusers with parental consent), 63-6-222
(authorizing physicians to perform emergency medical or surgical treatment on
minors despite the absence of parental consent where there was a reasonable
good faith determination that delay would result in serious threats to minor's
well being or after reasonable effort has been made to notify parents), 63-6223 (authorizing physicians to provide medical care to pregnant minors without
knowledge or consent of parents).
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Sandra Cardwell, a minor five months shy of her eighteenth
birthday who suffered from persistent back pain, had decided on
her own to visit a blind osteopath who had treated her father in
the past. 155 She paid the osteopath's fee with one of her father's
blank, signed checks that was given to her when she needed
money. 156 Ostensibly, as a result of the osteopath's treatment of
Ms. Cardwell, she had to be hospitalized and lost normal bladder
control and some sensation in her buttocks and legs.15 7 She and
her parents instituted an action against the osteopath alleging,
among other things, "battery (failure to obtain parental consent),
negligent failure to obtain consent, and failure to obtain informed
15 8
consent."
After reviewing the statutes that the Tennessee Legislature had
enacted, the Tennessee Supreme Court found "no intent on the
part of the Legislature to establish a comprehensive statutory
scheme that would occupy the area of medical treatment of
minors" 159 or "abrogate judicial adoption of an exception to the
general common law rule requiring parental consent to treat
minors." 160 Instead, the court characterized the legislation as
"provid[ing] conditional immunities from certain types of liability
in specific situations.., or promot[ing] certain social purposes,
such as treatment of drug abuse or venereal disease in
minors." 16 1 Hence, recognition at common law of the "mature
minor" doctrine was considered wholly consistent with existing
Tennessee statutory and tort law. 162 Furthermore, the jury had
155. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 741.
156. Id. at 742.

157. Id.
158. Id. The suit, which was filed on April 22, 1983, had initially alleged
medical malpractice. Id.
159. Id. at 744.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 748-49. Tennessee courts have recognized that the "rule of
reason is one of the bases of the common law ... but [it] will be modified and
extended by analogy, construction and custom so as to embrace new relations
springing up from time to time to conform with the change and desire of
society." Powell v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 727, 730
(1965).
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accurately concluded that Sandra Cardwell had the maturity,
education, experience, ability and judgment to knowingly consent
163
to the osteopath's treatment.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The present legislative scheme for the health care of minors in
New York State and elsewhere engenders a great deal of

confusion. Are physicians simply refusing to treat "emancipated"
or "mature" minors without parental consent or are they only
doing so when such treatment is clearly for the minor's benefit
and would withstand even the most rigorous scrutiny? Anecdotal
evidence supports the latter hypothesis, .but is it fair to put our

health care workers and our children in this precarious position?
Furthermore, given mounting malpractice costs and the
concomitant transformation of the American family, particularly
in the country's urban areas, can we rest comfortably with this
arrangement?
Courts and the health care community deserve better guidance

from their respective state legislatures. When the New York State
Legislature addressed the provision of outpatient mental health
163. Id. at 749. Other courts have also adopted the "emancipated minor"
doctrine or the "mature minor" doctrine at common law in the face of silent or
less-than-comprehensive legislation. In Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of
Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970), the Supreme Court of Kansas
determined that a 17 year old minor was of sufficient age and maturity to
comprehend the nature and consequences of a "pinch graft" utilized to repair
her finger and therefore no parental consent had been required. Id. at 338. The
Supreme Court of Kansas could have more easily relied upon the emergency
exception since the girl's mother was semi-conscious at the time of the injury,
and her father lived two hundred miles away. Id. at 333. In Bakker v. Welsh,
108 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1906), surgeons performed an operation to remove a
tumor from a 17 year old boy's ear. Id. at 95. The surgeons were found not
liable for damages to the boy's father, who had not consented to the operation,
because, inter alia, the boy was almost grown into manhood, had gone from
his farm to a large city, accompanied by an aunt and two sisters, to submit to
an examination and receive advice, and ultimately had a fairly minor surgical
operation performed. Id. at 96. See also Walter Wadlington, Minors and
Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115, 117-20
(1973).
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care for minors in 1983,164 it did so because mental health
practitioners and agencies providing such care, even with the
benefit of Public Health Law section 2504, had been uncertain
about what the parental role should be and if any such role was
appropriate in instances such as child abuse or incest.165
Obviously, under such circumstances, the old adage that parents
most accurately perceive their children's health needs falls to
pieces and we as a society are forced to consider alternative
means to address and treat such children's medical situations.
What, then, should state legislaturesdo?
The piecemeal statutory approach to minors' health care issues
existing in most jurisdictions requires a road map to follow and
leaves open the possibility of overlooking or ignoring certain key
provisions. In New York State, both Senator Meyerson's 'bill 166
and A. 6585167 attempted to consolidate such provisions in one
location. State legislators in New York and elsewhere should now
revisit and complete this task. The emergent statute will most
likely authorize all minors to consent to particular medical
treatment and some minors to consent to all medical treatment.
164. See supra notes 95, 103-104 and accompanying text; see also
Governor's Approval Memorandum to 1983 N.Y. Laws 790, 1983 N.Y. LEG.
ANN. 339. "[P]arental consent will generally be required before mental health
services on an outpatient basis are provided to a minor." Id. However, the
Governor noted that "[p]arental consent will not be required ... in [those]
cases where mental health services are necessary to the minor's well-being and
where requiring parental consent would be detrimental to the minor." Id.
165. See Governor's Approval Message to 1983 N.Y. Laws 790, 1983
N.Y. LEG. ANN. 339.
166. See S. 9464, supra note 77. Senator Meyerson's bill states "that
persons of at least sixteen years of age and emancipated minors may give
effective consent to health care." S. 9464, supra note 77; see also supra notes
78-88 and accompanying text.
167. See A. 6585, supra note 21. A. 6585 sought to amend General
Obligations Law § 3-104 so that "[miedical, dental, and health services may be
rendered to minors of any age without the consent of a parent or legal guardian
when, in the physician's judgment, an attempt to secure consent would result
in delay or treatment which would increase the risk to the minor's life or
health." A. 6585, supra note 21.
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Neither approach would be foolproof. For example, the status
approach often denies an entire class of fully capable minors the
authority to consent by setting arbitrary cut-offs, such as eighteen
years of age. On the other hand, the health needs approach
cannot keep pace with evolving pathology and treatment methods.
Furthermore, it imposes a value judgment as to which ills society
can or cannot tolerate going untreated.
Only by combining these approaches can the state legislatures
most comprehensively address the needs of minors and build the
greatest flexibility into the system. To impose the guidelines
courts and health care workers crave, and at the same time allow
for flexibility, is not contradictory and, if anything, most truly
acknowledges the world in which we live and work today. Will
the parent be unavailable when his or her consent is needed, 168
and will the physician's fear of liability result in very narrow
statutory interpretations? A comprehensive statutory scheme may
not allay all of parents' and health care workers' worst fears, but
it will at least provide "one-stop" shopping and ensure that all
available options are examined in a timely fashion. 169
Since the courts are queasy about coming out and recognizing
the "emancipated minor" doctrine in the health care context, state
legislatures must take the lead. If a given legislature is reluctant
to use the term "emancipated minor" with a corresponding
definition, it should at least clarify and broaden the categories of
minors viewed as "emancipated." Take for example, the New
York State Legislature. Did they intend to include minors who

168. See Carol Lawson, Distance Makes the Heart Skip for Commuter
Moms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, § C, at 1.
169. In 1973, The Committee on Youth of the American Academy of

Pediatrics wrote "A Model Act Providing for Consent of Minors for Health
Services" that could be used as a guidepost for states reconsidering their

legislation and attempting to design a more comprehensive, localized scheme.
Committee on Youth, A Model Act Providingfor Consent of Minorsfor Health
Services, 51 PEDIATRICS 293 (1973). Certainly, the argument for a uniform
law that crosses state lines itself is compelling given our present day mobility
and a uniform law's potentially deterrent effect on "forum shopping" on the

part of runaway teens.
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have married and then divorced or separated? 17 0 What about
those minors who have borne children and then put them up for
adoption or in foster care, or the minor father of a child born out
of wedlock who has had nothing to do with the support or
upbringing of that child?

Minors who are self-supporting, residing apart from parents, or
managing their own financial affairs, also deserve to bring the
same autonomy to bear on their medical treatment as they do in
other areas of their lives. It is a hypocrisy that such individuals
are regarded at common law in New York State, for example, as

responsible for the payment of their own medical bills, 17 1 but are
not always allowed to authorize the very treatments they are
72
financing. 1

Categories of emancipation will continue to evolve. In New
York, Senator Meyerson's bill recognized this and included a
definition of "emancipated minor" "without limitation to its

meaning at common law ....

"173 Although one might say that
such a definition elevates flexibility over certainty, it also invites
courts to continually revisit the concept of emancipation and

address

its

evolving

circumstances.

A

new

category

of

"emancipated minors" will invariably percolate through the
judicial system for some period of time before it is deemed to be
recognized at common law. Legislatures could then reap the
170. See Rhonda Cohn, Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, MED.
TRAL TECH. Q., 286, 288 (1985) (stating that a majority of the thirty-four
states allowing married minors to consent to their own medial care do not take
away the minor's emancipated status if divorce or annulment follows).
171. See, e.g., Cidis v. White, 71 Misc. 2d 481, 482-83, 336 N.Y.S.2d
362, 363 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (holding that parents cannot be held
responsible for the payment of their emancipated minor child's optometrist's
bills); Staten Island Hosp. v. Porter, 59 Misc. 2d 389, 392, 298 N.Y.S.2d
598, 601 (Civ. Ct. Richmond County 1969) (holding that the father of a 19year-old minor in the military was not responsible for paying the minor's
hospital expenses).
172. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (only those persons
eighteen years of age or older, married, parents of a child, or pregnant can
authorize medical treatments on their own behalf without parental consent).
173. S. 9464, supra note 77; see also supra notes 78-84 and accompanying
text.
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benefits of this intensive examination by amending the law and
providing express recognition of a new emancipation category.
Hence, inclusion of the clause "without limitation to its meaning
at common law" would legitimize ongoing analysis of the
emancipation concept and encourage a continuing dialogue
between the courts and the legislatures.
In many ways, the "mature minor" doctrine expresses the
internal components of the concept of emancipation; rather than
looking at the external trappings of adulthood, the "mature
minor" doctrine enumerates the qualities adults are assumed to
bring to the decision-making process. Thus, if a minor is
sufficiently mature and intelligent to understand the benefits and
risks of a proposed medical treatment, and to make a reasoned
decision on the basis of such knowledge, that minor's decision
should be honored regardless of the opinion, or lack thereof, of
the minor's parent or guardian.
As already noted, legislatures around the country have been
somewhat reluctant to statutorily authorize mature minors to
consent to their own health care given what is perceived as a
highly subjective analysis of the "maturity" criteria.174 In
contrast, however, and without much reluctance, courts have
continually mulled over these criteria in a host of circumstances,
including those involved in In re Long Island Jewish Medical
Center.175 Out of these judicial pronouncements, a pattern has
emerged. For example, where the treatment is for the minor's
own benefit, the "mature minor" doctrine is far more likely to be
recognized than when the treatment will benefit a third party.1 76
Moreover, rarely has a minor below sixteen years of age been

174. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship,
and Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH.
L. REV. 463, 515-16 (1983) ("Determinations of maturity are hopelessly
subjective, which means that a judge - rather than a minor or her parents is the real decisionmaker.").
175. 147 Misc. 2d 724, 730, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1990); see also supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
176. See Veilleux, supra note 35, at 523-24; see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
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viewed as sufficiently mature. 17 7 The nature of the treatment also
plays a role in the "maturity" analysis. Where it will not involve
a great deal of risk or complications as a consequence, making it
easier for a younger person to fully comprehend and appreciate,
and where it is deemed "necessary" by health care providers,
chances are, once again, that the courts will recognize the
"mature minor" doctrine. 17 8
Despite the benefits that might accrue from statutorily
codifying these maturity benchmarks, courts would continue to
be drawn into the process of assessing the maturity of individual
minors with or without established legislative criteria. Rather
than confining the parameters of a court's queries, a better
approach is to allow the courts a certain degree of discretion.
Hence, state legislatures should authorize "mature minors" to
consent to their own medical treatment after a court holds a
hearing to determine, inter alia, whether a given minor
sufficiently understands the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment. In essence, this is what courts do best, as no other
institution is better equipped to weigh the facts of a given
situation and arrive at a reasoned decision.
By codifying the "mature minor" doctrine, legislatures would
again be harmonizing the law with what is already current
practice. For example, this author and other commentators have
not yet found any case in New York State where a physician has
been held liable for providing treatment to a mature minor
without parental consent.179 Legislatures should also make
crystal clear that minors, like adults, must give "informed
consent" before the physician is permitted to go forward,
regardless of whether they are seeking to consent to their own
177. See Tania E. Wright, A Minor's Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25

How. L.J. 525, 532 (1982) (noting that "the age range of sixteen to eighteen
[is] the age range of capacity for fully independent judgment"). But see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(naming fourteen as the age "that the [child's] moral and intellectual
maturity ... approaches that of the adult").
178. See Wadlington, supra note 163, at 119; see also Veilleux supra note

35, §§ 3, 7.
179. See NYSBA Report, supra note 42, at 87.
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treatment under the "mature minor" doctrine or because of some
other category. In other words, they must understand their
condition or problem, the nature and purpose of the proposed
treatment, the risks and consequences of the proposed treatment,
the probability that the proposed treatment will be successful and
the feasible alternative options, including no treatment at all. 180

This, too, is an individual determination with which courts may
or may not become involved.
Legislatures also need to revisit, clarify and perhaps expand

upon the particular health needs of minors that would warrant
their own consent to medical treatment. For example, New York

Public Health Law section 2504 authorizes certain minors to
consent to "medical, dental, health and hospital services . . ."
without defining what these services are. 18 1 There has been
litigation over this very issue involving the condom availability
program commenced in New York City's high schools by the

New York City Board of Education as part of its mandated
HIV/AIDS education curriculum.182 The appellate division
recently determined that condom availability is a "health service"

under section 2504,183 and therefore, the statute requires either
parental consent for participation in the program or an opt-out
provision. 184
180. Id. at 86; see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2803-c(3)(a), (e),
2805-d (McKinney 1993); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 751.9(h)
(1985).
181. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504.
182. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d
Dep't 1993).
183. Id. at 52, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
184. Id. at 53, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 264. The petitioners in Alfonso had argued
correspondingly that since the condom availability plan was a "health service,"
an implicit corollary to § 2504(1) is that persons under eighteen years of age
may not give effective consent to such services. Id. at 51-52, 606 N.Y.S.2d at
263. Certain amicus curiae in the case, led by the New York Civil Liberties
Union, had argued that § 2504 was intended to expand, not contract, young
persons' access to medical treatment and that the court should resist
petitioners' attempt to give the provision such a limited interpretation. Brief
Amicus Curiae for the New York Civil Liberties Union, et al., at 11-16,
Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195 A.D.2d 46, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1993).
The amicus curiae also noted that nowhere in § 2504 was there a declaration
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The New York City Board of Education's condom availability
program was instituted as a means of thwarting the alarming rate
185
in which adolescents are contracting the HIV/AIDS infection.
The New York State Legislature's authorization of HIV testing
for minors capable of giving informed consent stems from the
same social policy concerns. 18 6 However, whereas physicians are
expressly authorized to treat minors for sexually transmitted
diseases 187 without parental consent, 188 Article 27-F of the New
York Public Health Law contains no such express authorization
189
for HIV/AIDS treatment.

Minors in New York State and elsewhere who seek treatment
as a result of testing positive for HIV can probably do so without
obtaining parental consent under a variety of creative statutory

interpretations.

190

For example, the minor has exhibited, without

the benefit of a codified "mature minor" doctrine, the ability to
give "informed consent" to his or her testing that can be carried

over to his or her treatment. Additional exceptions already
that persons under eighteen must obtain parental consent. Id. at 14. Contra In
re Thomas B, 152 Misc. 2d 96, 98, 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (Fain. Ct.
Cattaraugus County 1991) ("An implicit corollary of [§ 2504(1)] is that a
person under eighteen years of age may not give consent for [medical, dental,
health aid hospital] services.").
185. See supra note 1; Alfonso, 195 A.D.2d at 53, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
186. See supra note 1.
187. The category of sexually transmitted diseases does statutorily
encompass HIV/AIDS. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAWv § 2311 (directing the
Commissioner of Health and Public Health Council to promulgate a list of
sexually transmissible diseases); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 10,
§ 23.1 (1983) (listing sexually transmissible diseases).
188. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2305(2) (McKinney 1993) ("A licensed
physician... may diagnose [or] treat.., a person under the age of twentyone years without the consent or knowledge of the parents... where such
person is infected with a sexually transmissible disease. .. ").
189. However, § 2781(1) does authorize a physician to perform HIV related
tests where the physician has received "written, informed consent of the
subject of the test who has capacity to consent ... " N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2781(1).
190. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(4) (providing that a
physician may authorize treatment of a minor for HIV/AIDS if "in the
physician's judgment an emergency exists and the person is in immediate need
of medical attention").
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codified by section 2504 and other state law provisions in New
York and elsewhere, such as the emergency exception, along
with strong public policy concerns favoring prompt intervention,
can also be viewed as authorizing a physician's treatment of a
minor for HIV/AIDS without first obtaining parental consent. 191
Rather than relying on these elaborate contortions, state
legislatures should explicitly authorize HIV/AIDS treatment
without parental consent. No disease is more worthy of prompt,
uninterrupted treatment, or more likely to fall into the
communication gap between parent and child. Although it is
unlikely that a parent would deny consent for treatment of this
fatal disease, the minor might forego treatment entirely rather
than reveal his or her medical condition to a parent.
Similar strained readings of existing statutory constructs come
into play in the arena of abortion and contraception. For
example, as already noted, New York State does not have a
statute which regulates when minors may receive abortions
without parental consent. Any State action would be limited by
federal constitutional principles and, where federal funding is
provided, federal regulations. 192 The same holds true for
191. See NYSBA Report, supra note 42, at 90.
192. In 1975, a proposed amendment to New York Public Health Law
§ 2504 which would have, subject to the provisions of subdivision one,
prohibited abortions for persons under eighteen without first obtaining parental
consent, was defeated. See S. 2419-B/A. 3111-B, N.Y. Legis., 198th Sess.
(1975). The provision would have authorized physicians to perform such
abortions without parental consent if they "reasonably believe[d] that delay
caused by [their] diligent attempt to secure such consent [would] result in
permanent and serious physical injury of such person." Id. Subsequent United
States Supreme Court cases have established that parental consent requirements
may only be imposed on a minor's right to an abortion if a judicial bypass
alternative is also made available. See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 ("[If
the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents'
consent to an abortion, it must also provide an alternative procedure whereby
authorization for the abortion can be obtained."). Furthermore, where such
abortions would be funded pursuant to certain federal programs, no consent
requirement may be imposed. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 350(1)(e)
(McKinney 1992) ("[Sbo long as federal law and regulations require, family
planning services ...

shall be offered and promptly furnished to eligible

persons of childbearing age, including children who can be considered sexually
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contraception, and it was a New York statute prohibiting the sale
or distribution of contraceptives to minors under sixteen years of
age that provided the vehicle for the United States Supreme Court
to confirm a minor's privacy rights in Carey v. Population
Services International.193
This article does not attempt to address the highly charged
issues of abortion and contraception for minors. However, it is
important to note some of the ways in which state statutes, like
New York's Public Health Law section 2504, have been
interpreted to allow provisions of these services to minors who
are neither at least eighteen years of age, married, nor parents of
children, without parental consent. For example, the performance
of an abortion has been viewed as an emergency for which any
delay to secure parental consent would pose a grave risk to the
minor's life or health. 194 Minors who seek contraceptive devices
have also been viewed as "emancipated" to a limited extent, and
therefore, authorized to consent to solely sex-related health
care. 195
The danger of these elaborate justifications should be
particularly evident to abortions-rights advocates who see the
United States Supreme Court chipping away further at the
doctrines first enunciated in Roe v. Wade. 196 State courts,
including those in New York, are increasingly filling the void by
interpreting the rights provided by state constitutions in a more

active ... -"), 365-a(3)(c) ("[M]edical assistance shall include.., family
planning services and supplies for eligible persons of childbearing age,

including children under twenty-one years of age who can be considered
sexually active, who desire such services and supplies, in accordance with the
requirements of federal law and regulations .... ."); see also N.Y. COMP.
CODES & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 463.1, 463.2(b)(1)-(2), 463.6 (1988).

193. 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
194. Harriet F. Pilpel et al., Sex-Related Health Care for Minors, N.Y.
L.J., February 27-28, 1975, at 1.

195. Id.
196. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759
(1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting grantees under Title X projects from

engaging in counseling concerning referrals for and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning).
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expansive manner. 197 Despite its continuing controversy, state
legislatures should presently complete the task of codifying where
minors stand on these issues in a manner consistent with state
constitutional jurisprudence.
In conclusion, the controversy over a minor's right to consent
to his or her own health care is bound to continue, but the
confusion should not. The time is ripe for state legislatures to
reassess and clarify provisions addressing a minor's health care
and to provide the necessary guidance to minors, parents, and
health care providers.

197. See, e.g., Hope v. Perales, 150 Misc. 2d 985, 991-94, 571 N.Y.S.2d
972, 978 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1991), aff'd, 189 A.D.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d
948 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that based on the New York Constitution
discrimination in Medicaid funding between childbirth and abortion was
unlawful notwithstanding earlier decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which held that the Federal Constitution does not guarantee nondiscriminatory
funding). It should be noted that this case has been appealed by the defendants
and was argued before the New York Court of Appeals on March 17, 1994. A
decision is pending. See James Dao, Lawyer Takes Abortion-Rights Case to
Top Albany Court, N.Y. L.J., March 18, 1994 at B5.
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